

NEW WAR ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER?

Exploring the Newness of the New Wars Using the Case of the 1838 Missouri Mormon War

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Introduction

They “must be treated as enemies, and must be exterminated or driven from the State.”ⁱ These chilling words, so similar to the rhetoric heard from the mouths of the Rwandan *genocidaires* or Former Yugoslav nationalists in the 1990s, are actually over 165 years old. They were spoken by Missouri Governor Lilburn Boggs in late 1838, during the endgame of the Missouri Mormon War. This conflict, fought in the context of weak governmental authority, between poorly trained paramilitary factions, resulted in Missouri settlers driving up to 15,000 Mormons out of the state.

In recent years, the proliferation of civil conflicts in the developing and former Communist world has caused scholars to claim that in places like the Former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Columbia, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan, we are seeing an unprecedented kind of warfare. These “New Wars,” they argue, are characterized by the targeting of civilians; powerful non-state actors; prolonged, seemingly intractable, hostilities; connections to organized crime; and exclusivistic ethnic, religious and sectarian ideologies (Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2005).

However, as I will demonstrate below, using the case of the Missouri Mormon War, some elements of the New Wars are not entirely new. As Stathis Kalyvas argues, “old civil wars are not as different from new civil wars as they appear to be” (2001, p. 113; cf. Berdal 2003). That said, I will also show that there have been fundamental shifts in the

global political economy since the end of the Cold War, that have made the world more vulnerable to prolonged civil wars.

a. Weak Semi-Democratic States

While the post-Cold War era saw a rapid expansion of democracy throughout the world, it has also seen a steady “fragmentation and decentralization of the state” (Kaldor 1999, p. 90) especially in the developing world – through deregulation, privatization and the erosion of sovereignty and centralized authority. When states make the transition to democracy in this setting, they are particularly vulnerable to civil war. This is because “semi-democracies,” as Henderson and Singer call states that have electoral contests but lack strong constitutional structures and the rule of law, have neither “the potential for resolving conflict peacefully” that exists in well-developed democracies nor “the threat of repression” of a strong authoritarian government (2000, pp. 279-280). In this context, illustrated tragically in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the development of democracy in a weak state often holds the danger of encouraging intolerant majoritarianism and extra-legal methods of guaranteeing security for political constituencies. When a ruling group sees its power threatened by the growing political or economic might of rival groups, they may turn to violence – Clausewitz’s politics by other means – to protect their position.

However, the use of force to solidify political power in a weak semi-democratic state is not unique to the New Wars. It also occurred on the American frontier. When in the early 1830s members of the new Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (commonly known as Mormons) flocked to fulfill their prophet Joseph Smith’s millennial vision of a “New Jerusalem” in Jackson County, Missouri, the USA’s newest state, existing settlers

“took violent exception” (Collette 1977, p. 3) seeing them as a “a threat to the political balance of power” (Ostling & Ostling 1999, p. 33). Suspicious of Mormons’ seemingly “fanatic loyalty to their leaders,” lack of support for slavery and friendliness to the native Americans, the Missourians were afraid the Mormons would gain demographic superiority and capture the county’s elected offices (LeSeuer 1987, p. 3; Stewart 1967, pp. 2-3).

By 1833, the Mormons numbered about a third of Jackson County and the Missourians had had enough. A citizens’ committee issued a statement demanding the Mormons leave the county. On 20 July 1833, a mob destroyed the Mormon printing press and “publicly tarred and feathered” two Mormon leaders. After continued violent reprisals, the Mormons surrendered and by November had left the county, moving north to Daviess County (LeSueur 1987, p. 3; Baugh 1998, p. 115; Baugh 2000, p. 7).

However, the Daviess residents were no more willing to welcome the flood of displaced Mormons as had been the Jacksonians, especially when the Mormons “quickly became the dominant political force in the county” (LeSueur 1987, p. 59). While a tense peace existed for several years, renewed hostilities were provoked by the elections in Gallatin, Daviess County, on 6 August 1838. Fearing opposition from them, supporters of state legislator candidate W.P. Peniston violently repulsed Mormons going to the polls, causing a riot that escalated into “minor clashes” between “roving bands of Mormons and Missourians, and burning and pillaging ... by both sides.” (Stewart 1967, p. 16. See also: Collette 1977, p. 105; Launius 1998, p. 65).

b. The Privatization of Violence

As a state's power, legitimacy and revenues decline, it loses control of its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Thus in the context of a weak state, private actors are able to wrest the power to be violent from the state, and citizens increasingly take private, non-state, measures to protect their security (van Crevelde 1991, p. 192; Kaldor 1999, p. 4). This privatization of violence means that paramilitary, irregular and nonconventional armed forces are used extensively in the New Wars, which "very rarely...involve regular armies on both sides" – leading to a blurring of the classical distinction between civilian and soldier (van Crevelde 1991, p. 20). Since such non-state actors often lack the authority of a strong state, their armies "are characteristically undisciplined and ill-trained guerillas and not usually subject to the effective command and control of superior officers mindful of the regulation of armed conflicts" (Bassiouni 1997, p. 36).

The lack of strong police and security structures on the American frontier also allowed the widespread private banditry and civic unrest that gave the "Wild West" its name.ⁱⁱ Into this vacuum stepped vigilantism and citizen militias controlled by the individual states (not by the federal government). The militia companies were raised by local communities, often the counties, and consisted of irregular citizens mustered only a few times a year and in emergencies. They were also notorious for their majoritarian, undisciplined, unstable and fragmented record. (LeSueur 1987, pp. 1-2; Baugh 2000, pp. 19-29).

The militia system played into the existing social tensions between the Missourians and the Mormons. In 1838, the Missouri state legislature had designated a new county, Caldwell, for exclusive Mormon settlement, thinking it would reduce contact, and thus potential for conflict, with the other settlers. However, this actually exacerbated the

conflict, because it encouraged faster Mormon settlement and, through the militia system, allowed them to create their own army (Baugh 2000, pp. 12, 14). While the Caldwell County militia was *de jure* a unit of the State militia, it was *de facto* a military wing of the Mormon church, since the “church controlled all of the county offices” and “enjoyed near autonomy of action in their especially created domain” (Launius 1998, p. 63). Likewise, the militias in the non-Mormon communities became inherently anti-Mormon, rather than even-handed protectors of the citizenry, for “those who volunteered were aching for a fight against the Mormons” (Launius 1998, p. 81).

Therefore, even though the militias were officially part of the state apparatus, they were prone to capture by private interests and were populated with poorly trained civilians operating in a paramilitary role. The system allowed the creation of two opposing armies in a tense political context. Similar situations in weak states in today’s world allow quasi-official or non-state militias to become *de facto* private armies.

c. Identity Politics

The lack of a strong state to guarantee security for all population groups in its territory and the contentious politics of democratic transition create a context prone to fierce politics of identity. Threatened by each other’s potential political power, open to violent abuse in an atmosphere of impunity, cultural, ethnic or religious groups often turn inward for mutual protection. This polarization deepens political and cultural rifts within a society, fragmenting it into “communities of fear” (Ignatieff 1997, p. 45) and exposing it to a much higher risk of civil war (Henderson & Singer 2000, p. 284).

In this context, charismatic despots like Milošević, who have access to military force, are able to frame themselves as the defenders of particular identity groups and “call on

those members' loyalty even to the point where they are prepared to die for it" (van Creveld 1991, 198). Thus, "The goals of the New Wars are about identity politics," (Kaldor 1999, p. 6) and are "waged for the souls of men" (van Creveld 1991, p. 215) rather than state interest or grand unifying ideological projects.

Identity politics were particularly relevant in the Missouri Mormon War. The Mormons had a "theology of entitlement" and Manifest Destiny (Ostling & Ostling 1999, p. 33). They believed that God had given them the lands of the Americas "to establish a millennial utopia" – to build a new Zion in the New World (Collette 1977, p. 3). This belief was perceived as a profound threat to the other settlers in Missouri, who feared for the security of their property when their neighbors claimed a divine right to settle and own the land on the American frontier. As Duffield observed about the New Wars, when citizens feel their property rights are threatened, and a weak state is unable to defend them, they will organize private protection (1998, p. 91).

In Missouri Mormon conflict, as in New Wars, this underlying fear of insecurity was undergirded by identity politics that polarized the Mormons and the other settlers into distinct and competing political entities. By July 1833, Jackson County settlers were circulating a manifesto saying that since the Mormons "declare openly that their God hath given them this county...we believe it a duty...to remove them from among us...."ⁱⁱⁱ

Displacement from Jackson County coincided with new challenges to the unity of the Mormon identity. Internal conflict over power and misuse of funds by some church leaders divided the Mormon community (Collette 1977, p. 100; Baugh 2000, p. 33). In the context of identity politics, dissent is perceived as tantamount to treason, for it threatens to divide, and thus reduce, the power of the community and subverts its

homogenizing ideology. Thus, said Kaldor, “among the first civilians to be targeted” in a New War “are those who espouse a different politics,” such as the moderate Hutus in Rwanda who were purged early in the genocide of Tutsis (1999, p. 9).

During 1838, then, the Mormon leadership began to crack down on dissenters. That spring, church official John Whitmer noted in his diary that the Mormon leader Joseph Smith had “stated that any person who said a word against the heads of Church, should be driven over these prairies as a chased deer by a pack of hounds....”^{iv} In June, some of the more strident and militarist Mormons, the “elitist corps” of the militia (Collette 1977, p. 102), created a paramilitary groups to intimidate dissenters (LeSueur 1994, p. 37; Baugh 2000, p. 36). Calling themselves the Danites, after the biblical warriors in the book of Judges,^v they organized to drive people suspected of subverting the church out of county, and “swore to support and protect each other, and to obey church leaders, whether right or wrong” (LeSueur 1994, p. 42).

By stifling the moderating voices that challenged them from within, the leadership found themselves in an easier position to engage in violence against their external challengers (Launius 1998, p. 65). As a result, the Danites refocused their attention to “revenge and plunder against the Missourians” (Collette 1977, p. 102). As such, the Danites resemble many of the non-state actors in New Wars that are more “constructed on charismatic lines than institutional ones, and ... motivated less by ‘professionalism’ than by fanatical, ideologically-based, loyalties” (van Creveld 1991, p. 197).

Focusing on the ‘enemy without’ also served the function of silencing the ‘enemy within’ and consolidating the Mormon leadership’s power. By escalating the conflict, the Mormon leaders invited a reaction from the Missourians, which would cause the

Mormons to further close ranks and rally behind their leaders – leading to further radicalization and escalation. As Kaldor has noted, such politics results in a strange dependency between the elites of the opposing groups – they both need each other to prove to their constituencies that there is a real external threat: “Because the various warring parties share the aim of sowing ‘fear and hatred,’ they operate in a way that is mutually reinforcing, helping each other to create a climate of insecurity and suspicion” (Kaldor 1999, p. 9).

The growing bitterness of the conflict’s polarization was illustrated 4 July 1838 – Independence Day – in an incendiary sermon and self-fulfilling prophecy by Sidney Rigdon, a “fiery crusader” and close confidant of Joseph Smith’s (LeSueur 1987, p. 49). Saying he would rather “sleep with the dead, than be oppressed among the living,” he warned the Missourians that

the mob that comes on us to disturb us; it shall be between us and them a war of extermination, for we will follow them, till the last drop of their blood is spilled, or else they will have to exterminate us: for we will carry the seat of war to their own houses, and their own families, and one party or the other shall be utterly destroyed.^{vi}

d. Mass Displacement and the Targeting of Civilians

Framed as demographic struggles for supremacy, New Wars are unlike traditional warfare which aims to capture and hold territory. Instead the “strategic goal” of the New Wars “is population expulsion,” that is, “getting rid of everyone of a different identity” through ‘ethnic cleansing,’ induced famine and genocide (Kaldor 1999, p. 7-8). In this context, the civilian, not the soldier, becomes the primary target of military action, and armies actually “spare each other” to save resources needed to attack civilians (Münkler 2005, p. 3).

However, the Missouri Mormon War shows that mass displacement and killing of civilians is, as Kalyvas pointed out, “nothing new” (2001, p. 110). On 18 October 1838, responding to violent vigilantism against Mormons throughout the region, 400 Mormon troops attacked the Daviess County towns of Gallatin, Grindstone Forks and Millport, “looting and burning about two dozen buildings” (Launius 1998, p. 72) taking prisoners and forcing most of the non-Mormons out of the county (LeSueur 1987, pp. 117-120). This was followed by a deadly clash at Crooked River, Ray County (bordering the Mormon Caldwell County) on 24 October, when Mormon militia tried to rescue three of their spies from their Missourian captors (LeSueur 1987, pp. 137-142; Baugh 2000, pp. 99-109).

Feeling all semblance of civic order slipping away, Missouri Governor Lilburn W. Boggs called up 2,500 militia and issued his infamous “Extermination Order” on 27 October 1838 that in effect “gave license to those who wanted to attack the Mormons and drive them from their homes” (Launius 1998, p. 80; See also: Baugh 2000, p. 109):

[H]aving made war upon the people of this State ... The Mormons must be treated as enemies, and must be exterminated or driven from the State if necessary for the public peace – their outrages are beyond all description.^{vii}

This order was not officially rescinded until Missouri Governor Christopher S. Bond did so by Executive Order in 1976.^{viii}

Said Stephan LeSeuer, a foremost historian of the conflict, “the constant labeling” of Mormons “as fanatics, creatures and degraded human beings dehumanized them and created an atmosphere that allowed the governor to treat them as subhuman beings who could be exterminated” (1987, pp. 152-153). That same day, while they were not yet aware of the Extermination Order, 200 Missourian vigilantes attacked the unsuspecting

Mormon settlement of Haun's Mill, killing 17 civilians and wounding 14 – the most serious confrontation of the war (Stewart 1967, pp. 18-19; LeSueur 1987, p. 162-168; Launius 1998, p. 84; Baugh 2000, pp. 115-127).

With their ominous orders in mind, the Missouri militia then marched on the main Mormon settlement, Far West, besieging it until the Mormons surrendered, allowed their leaders to be arrested and agreed to leave the state (LeSueur 1987, pp. 180-194; Baugh 2000, pp. 149-162). The militia moved into the town and began looting and vandalizing Mormon homes and property under the pretext of searching for weapons (Launius 1998, p. 89). Speaking of “open carnage and wanton destruction” (Collette 1977, p. 110), Mormon accounts of Far West's fall reported “widespread plundering, violence, and even rape...for days thereafter” (Launius 1998, p. 89).

By early 1839, almost every Mormon – up to 15,000 people – had fled the state to Illinois, leaving behind much of their property (Stewart 1967, p. 23). They took refuge in the town of Quincy, Illinois, whose citizens (not Mormons) mobilized to provide them with food, shelter and care (LeSueur 1987, pp. 234-240).

e. Greed Agendas

The exclusivist rhetoric of the New Wars, while important for understanding how certain parties might perceive the conflict can also often be misleading. Moreover, the shocking nature of massive violations of human rights can make the New Wars difficult for people to understand. Thus ‘ethnic’ or ‘religious’ conflict can often seem like a cauldron of primeval tribalism, irrational hatred and brutal violence. However, while irrationality no doubt plays a part in war, it can often mask and distract attention from a

“certain rational calculus” operating below the simplistic language of demographic struggle (Duffield 2001, p. 138).

The work of David Keen, for example, has shown that “The apparent ‘chaos’ of civil war can be used to further local and short-term interests” that are “frequently economic” (1998, p. 11). Where a weak state cannot protect the property rights of its citizens, they are vulnerable to abuse by predatory actors who take advantage of insecurity to make short term profits from extortion and pillage (pp. 25-33). For instance, Keen noticed there were “prosaic benefits” from ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, such as “a house, a television, a fee for transporting victims,” that were often missed by observers misled by “ancient hatreds” rhetoric (p. 53). Thus the economics of New Wars can create powerful incentives for “controlling, raiding and exploiting civilians” (p. 11). In other words, abusing civilians is not simply an aberration or unfortunate side effect of the New Wars, it is an end in itself (p. 12). That is, as Münkler said, “force has become a source of income” (2003, p. 16). Several other scholars have also shown the prevalence of economic agendas in driving and maintaining the New Wars (e.g. de Waal 1998; Duffield 1998 & 2001; Kaldor 1999; Collier 2000; Collier & Hoeffler 2003).

This ‘greed agenda’ was not absent from the Missouri Mormon War either – though the conflict is usually portrayed as a struggle over religion. Both the Missourian vigilantes and Mormon troops engaged in plunder. For instance, Mormon leaders ordered their soldiers “to live off the land – that is to steal from the Missourians” and one Mormon account recalled a Danite leader saying “the riches of the Gentiles [non-Mormons] should be consecrated to my people [the Mormons]” (LeSeuer 1994, pp. 42, 47). Likewise, according to LeSeuer, “the burning and plundering of non-Mormon

property was not the work of a small group of renegade Mormons or an aberration.... It was the general policy of Mormon troops operating in Daviess County.” The stolen property, including livestock, produce and other goods, was distributed among those living in Mormon settlements (LeSueur 1994, p. 48). Just as Keen has observed that economic agendas tend to warp any political and ideological agendas of the New Wars (1998, pp. 33-35), Mormon dissident John Corrill wrote, “the love of pillage grew upon them very fast....”^x

f. The Newness of the New Wars: Globalization

Though one should not diminish the gravity of a conflict that caused 50 fatalities,^x cost millions of dollars^{xi} and displaced several thousand people, the effects of the Missouri Mormon War were minor compared with the horrific scale of many contemporary wars which decimate whole peoples. For instance, an estimated 200,000 people perished in the Bosnian war, and some 2 million were displaced – an entirely different order of destruction.

Many scholars, including some skeptics of the New Wars concept, agree that a critical difference between the ‘Old’ and ‘New’ civil wars is the “intensification of global interconnectedness” (Kaldor 1999, p. 3). Globalization has both contributed to a proliferation of such wars, and exacerbated their intensity. The following outlines a few specific elements of the globalized world that have contributed to contemporary insecurity.

i. Transportation and Communications Technology

The revolution in global transportation and communications technologies have revolutionized war by exponentially quickening the “speed of political mobilization”

(Kaldor 1999, p. 7). The ubiquity of mass media has made it even easier for elites to manipulate and mold identities, as seen in the use of TV in the former Yugoslavia (Thompson 1999) and radio in Rwanda (Kellow & Steeves 1998) to whip up hatred and polarization. Moreover, mass media has facilitated the ability of small violent groups to capture headlines around the world, using spectacular terrorist violence and a little media savvy. (Nacos 2002). Communications innovation in general has enabled agents of violent groups to communicate with each much more quickly, through email, the internet, satellite phones and radio (Lia 2006, pp. 14-19). This has combined with the revolution in transportation technology, which has increased the mobility of violent groups, as seen when the 9/11 terrorists turned a civilian aircraft into a deadly weapon.

Therefore, unlike the Rwandan *genocidaires* who issued similar orders quickly and incessantly with radio, Governor Boggs' Extermination Order took several days to filter down to the Missouri militia rank and file. With modern telecommunications and motorized transport, the Mormons could have received rapid support from other church members on the East Coast. As it was, their co-religionists were stuck helplessly on the other side of the continent, for not even the railroad had yet arrived in Western Missouri.

ii. Trade and Finance

Deregulation of trade and finance has made it extremely easy for local combatants to link up with financiers and buyers of high-value natural resources, and conduct transactions at high speed. Several authors have shown that high commodity prices and low barriers to trade have been a vital fuel for the New Wars, financing armies and providing them with valuable foreign exchange (Collier 2000 & 2003; Rubin 2000; LeBillion 2001; Panel of Experts 2001; Pugh & Cooper 2004). Even without the

presence of key natural resources, smuggling guns, drugs and people (including refugees) are always lucrative activities and local actors are able to link up with transnational organized crime networks (Bassiouni 1997; Cillufo & Salmoiraghi 1999). Moreover, international political networks are able to quickly finance wars that they feel further their ideological objectives – for instance Al Qaeda has been described variously as a venture capitalist of terror (Bergen 2002) or a “Holy War Foundation” – dispensing grants for the conduct of jihad (Burke 2004, pp. 213-233). Said Duffield, “market deregulation has deepened all forms of parallel and transborder trade and allowed warring parties to forge local-global networks and shadow economies as a means of asset realisation and self-provisioning” (2001, p. 14).

In contrast the Mormons and Missourians had to rely on locally available resources – one could loot from the other side, but this had its limits. Therefore, the war was ultimately kept at a fairly low intensity by the lack of resources available to sustain large units of armed men, or purchase new weaponry and ammunition. As Münkler said, “The change in modes of funding is a crucial reason why the new wars may stretch over decades, with no end in sight” (2005, p. 1).

iii. Post-Cold War Military Surplus

Coinciding with new opportunities for trade has been the massive demobilization of the Cold War and Apartheid armed forces, flooding the global market with cheap military equipment and expertise. Enormous weapons caches were looted or sold off at rock-bottom prices. Thousands of US, British, South African and former Soviet soldiers – highly trained in the art of killing – were released into the workforce. This has produced an “avalanche of guns” into conflict zones (Klare 1997, pp. 55-77; Boutwell and Klare

2000) and a meteoritic growth in private security companies willing to advise, train or fight for warring parties throughout the world (Duffield 1998 & 2001; Singer 2003). Said Klare, “the sheer abundance of light weapons in international circulation, and the ease with which they are transported to areas of tension, has undoubtedly contributed to the incidence, duration, and intensity of armed conflict” (Klare 1997, p. 59).

While there was considerable proliferation of small arms on the American frontier, both the Mormons and Missourians were constrained by their cost. Moreover, they did not have access to today’s automatic weapons. Had they been given access to the massive post-Cold War stocks of arms, such as the now ubiquitous dirt-cheap AK-47, they may have been able to do a lot more damage. Perhaps another major mitigating factor in the Missouri Mormon War was that neither side had access to large configurations of heavy weaponry or explosives. Much of the fighting was hand to hand or with light weapons. Had the Mormons and Missourians had a cheap supply of ex-Soviet mortars and artillery the war may have been far more brutal.

iv. Diasporas

Nationalist and sectarian wars in the developing and post-communist world can be greatly exacerbated by the involvement of extremist groups who are able to tap into the vast sources of funds available from diaspora communities in the developed world (Kaldor 1999, p. 7). These émigré communities often feel a sense of obligation to, as well as idealized notions of, the ‘homeland’ (Cohen 1997). Armed groups are often able to capture significant portions of remittances back to the war zone, and diasporas may also volunteer expertise, leadership, assistance in smuggling arms and connections to developed world governments. Nationalistic diasporas were particularly important in the

Wars of Yugoslav Succession (Hockenos 2003). For instance, the documentary *The Brooklyn Connection*, shows how easy it was for a Kosovar-American construction worker to raise \$30 million for the Kosovo Liberation Army and purchase and transport to Kosovo enormous stocks of automatic weapons and high-powered sniper rifles (Quirijns 2005).

One can imagine that if the Mormon War occurred today, the some 12 million Mormons now scattered all over the globe would engage in a worldwide campaign to raise money, arms and public sympathy for their embattled co-religionists. As some of the world's largest companies are part-owned by Mormons, one would expect huge inversions of cash injected into the conflict and public relations companies hired to drum up media coverage of the war. One also might expect a similar reaction by the many people originally from Missouri but living throughout the US and the world, who might feel that their home-state was under attack.

g. Conclusion

The case of the Missouri Mormon shows that certain elements identified by scholars as unique to the New Wars – like weak semi-democratic states, privatization of violence, identity politics, mass displacement and greed agendas – are not really an innovation of the post-Cold War era. Indeed they share common features with civil and unconventional wars of a previous age.

However, there are elements of New Wars that distinctly new – for New Wars, though they often take place within state boundaries cannot really be classed as internal wars. Therefore, like Kaldor (1999) Duffield (1998 & 2001) and Berdal (2003), I believe the fundamental difference between old civil wars like the Missouri Mormon War and the

New Wars lies in globalization. The “new globalized war economy,” as Kaldor calls it (1999, p. 9), allows local actors, left unfettered by the disintegration of state power, to link up with “supranational intermediaries” (Duffield 1998, p. 69). These external sources of funds and supplies provide an engine, and powerful incentives, to prolong the conflict (Münkler 2005, p. 10). If, for instance, the Missouri Mormon War occurred in the 21st century, the Mormons might have made connections with arms traders, diaspora financiers, mercenaries, humanitarian assistance and transnational businesses, allowing them to fight the Missourians more effectively. As Duffield said, “Today’s successful warlords think globally but act locally” (1998, p. 81). One can conclude that if the Missouri Mormon War was rerun in this century it would have been far bloodier, far more expensive and far longer than it actually was.

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ⁱ Lilburn Boggs in LeSueur, S. C. (1987) *The 1838 Mormon War in Missouri*. (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press) p.152.

ⁱⁱ A term used, coincidentally, by Kaldor to describe the war in Croatia in the early 1990s (1999, p. 1)

ⁱⁱⁱ Stewart 1967, p. 3.

^{iv} Launius 1998, p. 64.

^v Judges 18 KJV.

^{vi} Rigdon 1838, pp. 5, 12.

^{vii} LeSueur 1987, pp. 151-152.

^{viii} Holzapfel & Cottle 1991, pp. 283-285, 306.

^{ix} John Corrill in LeSeuer 1987, p. 121.

^x Stewart 1967, p. 23.

^{xi} LeSeuer 1987, pp. 256-257.